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INTRODUCTION:

Two LAws

Academics with an interest in natural resources often are called upon to
probe the differences between the laws of nature and the laws of humans. I
choose as my reference points Law One, 186,000 miles per second - the speed
of light; and Law Two, 55 miles per hour - the speed of autos.
The juxtaposition of these two laws immediately inspires an intuitive sense
of a mismatch, a feeling of a poor fit in need of further explanation and
qualifier. Those human particles, after all, don't behave quite the same way
as the photons (or is it the waves?) of traveling light. The predictability enjoyed
by many of the natural sciences does not extend to the sciences of human
affairs. And let's admit right away that normative values enter the picture when
one begins to compare "laws" across disciplines. Without pausing to dispute
the particulars, the practitioners of natural sciences have little difficulty substantiating claims of "superiority" (in reliability, methods, and accomplishments) over those who pursue the social sciences.
Within the social sciences, too, the same sorts of pecking orders emerge,
with law near the bottom of virtually any scheme of hierarchical ordering. The
science of law has a dissonant ring to it, not unlike the science of shoveling,
or the art of changing tires. Certainly within the legal academy there is not
a great deal of whatever it is (accepted methodology, well established research
programs, agreement on central issues) that makes a subject a science.
II.

BETWEEN THE

LAWS

Historically, much of the great (and not-so-great) theory-building has been
parasitic to a degree. Darwin drew upon Malthus, Spencer upon Darwin. The
. This paper was delivered as the Fifth Annual Dunwody Lecture, University of Florida,
College of Law, March 14, 1986. The essay benefited from a presentation at the Third Institute
for Natural Resources Law Teachers, May 29-31, 1985, Denver, Colo.
.. William H. Rodgers, Jr., University of Washington, School of Law.
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social sciences have profited enormously from a borrowing of methods, models,
techniques, and patterns of thought from the natural sciences.' To mention but
one example, the second law of thermodynamics is a law of ultimate decline
familiar to physicists. 2 Looking closely at the suggestion, a political scientist can
observe Murphy's Law.
Law people, too, are learning about the business of borrowing, looking to
other disciplines for guidance, or more grandly, for models that can be used
to assemble the questions about a given phenomenon. Models of collapse and
decline are but one example. It was Alfred North Whitehead who observed
that information keeps no better than fish," and this idea of loss of content
over time has emerged as a central feature of information theory. 4 Extended
to law, the metaphor is of a statute with resolving power that declines over
time, a rotting away of the legislative product."
The legal phenomenon under scrutiny may be covered more comfortably
not by a model of directional change, featuring decline or improvement in the
law product over time, but of cyclical change. This sort of to-ing and fro-ing
around a norm might apply to the degree of deference extended by courts to
administrative decisions:
The competing considerations are delicately balanced; once a critical
mass representing a trend is established, it is subject to rapid reinforcement and acceleration by the sheer volume of judicial review case law.
The result is an oscillation around the norm and could be depicted by
a type of curve familiar to population biologists - rapid growth, followed
by collapse, build-up, and another period of rapid growth. Witness, in
this regard, the phenomenal rise of the hard look in the wake of the
1971 Overton Park decision and the striking retrenchment after Vermont
Yankee came down in 1978. '
Model-building within the law schools, in recent times, has profited greatly
from a poaching of ideas from the disciplines of history, economics and phi-

1.
CHANCE,

2.

See, e.g., W.

McNEILL,

AND ORGANIZATIONS:

E.g., I. ASIMOV,

WORLD VIEW

MYTHISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS

NATURAL

SELECTION IN A

THE HISTORY OF

(1986); H.

PERILOUS ENVIRONMENT

PHYSICS ch. 15 (1983); J.

KAUFMAN,

TIME,

(1985).

RIFKIN, ENTROPY: A NEW

(1980).

3.

Whitehead saw no reason to fight a losing battle against this law. See J. CAMPBELL,
ENTROPY, LANGUAGE, AND LIFE 72 (1982) (Whitehead's books
"arc full of idiosyncratic, newly-minted words and phrases. Once he had finished a manuscript,
Whitehead washed his hands of it. He refused to see it through the cditing and publishing process,
considering all that a waste of his valuable time. The result was that his books were riddled with
GRAMMATICAL MAN: INFORMATION,

mistakes undetectable by anyone but an expert.").

4. See id. (especially at 86: entropy "is missing information").
5. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Rodgers, Building
Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Resources Law, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 213, 218 (1981).
6. Rodgers, The Natural Law of Administrative Law, 48 Mo. L. REv. 101, 107 (1983) (citing
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)) (footnotes omitted);
see also Elliott, 77e Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523
(1983); Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept of Rights, 92 YALE LJ. 1174 (1983).
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losophy. 7 In this continuing search for a deeper understanding of the legal
relations among human beings, it is not impertinent to ask whether the persons
presumed by a given theory bear any resemblance to the people we know. H
One way to explore this question is to look to the laws of biology and psychology
that are concerned centrally with how people behave, in both their selfish and
altruistic moments. 9 Evolutionary biology, in particular, addresses changes in
populations over time, and is strongly suggestive of lines of inquiry for those
studying changes in legal rules or statutes as they live out their lives or are
introduced into new social environments."'
Any serious back-to-biology movement in law can be expected to draw heavily on game theory that deals with strategies of choice in a wide variety of
human interactions." Game theory must be distinguished sharply from benefitcost analysis, a version of decision theory that presupposes some summing-up
of the goods and bads by the decisionmaker and the deliberate selection of a
"best" outcome. 2 In game theory, the choice of the "best" is not formal and
definitive but is uniquely dependent upon what the other players do. The game
theory "best" is context-specific, provisional, and fluid. The theory lends itself
comfortably to the small-numbers interactions of legal practice - litigation,
negotiation, conflict-management, and conflict-perpetuation.
The centerpiece of game theory is the famous Prisoners' Dilemma, an illustration with two players, each with two choices, either to cooperate or defect.
"Each [player] must make the choice without knowing what the other will do.
No matter what the other does, defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both had
cooperated."" The inability to organize for the common benefit is the source
of anguish for the participants. The Prisoners' Dilemma serves as an astonishingly fertile fount of inspiration for research across the political sciences." In

7. E.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JusTIcE (1971); White, The Intvitabiliy of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1984).
8. Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources
Law, 10 EcOL. L.Q. 205 (1982).
9. E.g., C. LUMSDEN & E. WILSON, GENES, MIND, AND CULTURE: THE COEVOLUTIONARY
PROcESs (1981);

M.

MIDoELY,

EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION: STRANGE HOPES AND STRANGER

FEARS

(1985); Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 W. REv. BIOLO-OY 35 (1971); seealso J.
BECKSTROM, SOClOnIOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM IN THE COURTROOM OF THE
FUTURE (1985).
10. P. EHRLICH, THE MACHINERY OF NATURE: THE LIVING WORLD AROUND Us - AND How
IT WORKS

(1986); N.

ELDREDOE,

TIME FRAMES: THE RETHINKING OF DARWINIAN EVOLUTION AND
(1985); E. MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT:

THE THEORY OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA
DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION,

11.

See M.

EIGEN

AND INHERITANCE

& R.

WINKLER,

(1982).
LAWS OF THE GAME: HOW THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURE

16 (1981) ("Any truly comprehensive game theory would therefore have to include
a thorough understanding of the human psyche."); M. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL
INTRODUCTION (rev. ed. 1983).
12. See E. SToxEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978).
13. R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 8 (1984). See id. at 8, fig. I for a matrix
GOVERN CHANCE

of representative payoffs:
14. See R. AXELROD, supra note 13, passim.
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the environmental field, to mention but one recent example, the analysis has
been extended in an innovative way to describe the "Politicians' Dilemma"
thought to be behind the rapid expansion of federal environmental law in the
late 1960s and the early 1970s.'

11.

BREAKING AWAY FROM THE PRISONERS'

DILEMMA

Another recent imaginative effort, from which I draw my title, illustrates
conditions under which escape from the Prisoners' Dilemma becomes possible.",
The key is to posit a playing of the game over time, where the players can
learn and respond, and capture mutual benefits from their choices. This version
of an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma underscores the nonzero-sum features of the
7
game where A's gain is not necessarily at B's expense.'
It is comfortable to start with an assumption of striking differences between
isolated and frequent interactions between human beings. The entire theoretical
structure of altruism in biology rests upon notions either of kinship, where
closeness is built into the relationship as it were, or reciprocal dealings where
the benefits of the helping hand are acquired and extended over time."' Exchange theory and practice presuppose conditions where knowledge is built up
over time, and expectations informed by the web of understandings about needs,
timing, and quality. Thoroughly understood are the differences between your
brother and the other fellow, your friend and a stranger, your hometown and
the other place, the corner store and the conglomerate. It does not appear rash
to suggest that relationships with people you know or deal with over time tend
to be less strident and formal, less exploitative, more sympathetic and tolerant,
and more attentive to future relationships.
A.

Examples From the Law and Culture

Let's use this distinction between infrequent and habitual contact as hypothesis for a moment, and look to see whether it makes a difference if one
goes through life (or confronts the law) as drifter or colleague. Consider, initially, the simple matter of vocabulary. Any roster of short-termers must include
the hit-and-run driver, the one-night stand, the fly-by-night operator. Let's not
forget the carpetbagger, the itinerant lawyer, and the out-of-town architect (who
specializes, it seems, in designing law schools nationwide). These are not terms
of endearment, and they do not bespeak admiration, praise, respect, and reliability. Mention should be made of the classical arms-length transaction, a
sure tip-off that one of the principals is about to be skewered in this ever-so-

15. Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, I J. LAw, EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985).
16. R. AXELROD, supra note 13.
17. Zero-sum conditions where A's gain is B's loss are common in natural resources law
although the courts strive mightily to avoid them. See W. RODGERS, JR., CASES & MATERIALS ON
ENERGY & NATURAL RasouRcES LAW 248-49, 278, 329, 370-71, 632 (2d ed. 1983).
18. See, e.g., E. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE ch. 7 (1978); Trivers, supra note 9. On defining
the limits of "comradeship", see W. McNEILL, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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brief contact. Academics are consistently bewildered when they discover that
"visiting professor" is an odious classification or at best an academic subspecies
not entitled to the full measure of collegial reciprocity.
Confirmation of the frequent/one-time-only distinction can be found across
the spectrum of contemporary culture. A not-so-popular tune of recent vintage
is entitled, "Get Your Haircuts Close to Home." A trivial sentiment, to be
sure, but offering advice widely acted upon. Even so inconsequential a matter
as the shape of one's sideburns is not lightly placed at risk in the isolated
transaction. You may recall Chevy Chase, in the film Vacation, being trapped
by circumstance when the family car broke down in the remote wilds of New
Mexico. He asked the service station attendant, "How much to fix the car?"
The answer: "How much do you got?" Exploitation is the name of this game.
Some students may have missed the autobiography of Ron Luciano, former
big-league umpire, who explained that sometimes on the "bad days" (the ones
that followed the "good nights") he would instruct the catchers to call the balls
and strikes. There was no cheating here,' 9 and for reasons entirely predictable.
The relationship (between catcher and umpire) is strongly reciprocal, and the
game is played over time with all sorts of opportunities for paybacks, retaliation,
or reward.
From the laws come repeated expressions of this drifter/habitu6 distinction.
Observe a series of oral arguments before the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General is speaking now, and the questions are deferential, occasionally even
unctuous, tolerance is high, skepticism allayed, and respect mutual. This backscratching goes both ways. Now enter the rookie from the hinterlands, putting
in an accidental, once-in-a-career Supreme Court appearance. The mood changes,
the questions become a tad sharper, the interruptions more unrestrained. The
issues have nothing to do with it. Nor is it that one advocate is a friend, and
the other an enemy; the shift is more subtle, rather a change from acquaintance
to stranger. Whisperings within tell the Court that this game with the drifter
comes to an end at 12:00 noon, and strategies are suddenly on a short leash.
B.

Further Examples from Environmental Law

Illustrations from environmental law reinforce this pervasive distinction between short-termers and the regular patrons. Start, once again, at the level of
description and vocabulary. Here we find the pirate tankers, typified by the
rusty vessel operated under a Panamanian flag of convenience with a Turkish
captain and Cambodian crew. Take pity on the victim coast lines, drawn unwittingly into a game that is played at night and without leverage to apply to
the passing vessels.

20

19. R. LUCIANO & D. FISHER, THE UMPIRE STRIKES BACK 166 (1982) ("No one I worked
with ever took advantage of the situation, and no hitter ever figured out what I was doing. And
only once, when Ed Hermann was calling the pitches, did a pitcher ever complain about a call.").
20.

See R. MCGONICLE & M. ZACKER,
(1979); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
FATES, AND EFFECTS (1985).

ERS AT SEA
INPUTS,

POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: TANKSCIENCES,
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Consider next the gypsy waste-haulers whose exploitative tendencies are summarized nicely by the antics of the fellow who disposed of unwanted PCBs by
the simple expedient of allowing them to drain from the barrels while driving
over hundreds of miles of back roads in North Carolina.2' Expect the gypsy
to go for the large payoff because there is no tomorrow, at least insofar as this
relationship is concerned. The reports of tankers taking on hazardous wastes
as a part of the ballast (to be released somewhere else) will no doubt create
a new term of art - pirate-gypsies. These are fellows you definitely should
avoid.
Substantive laws in many ways reach out in attempts to constrain the hitand-runners. There are the bonds required from the coal miners, z2 the responsibility laws that extend to oil transporters and hazardous waste site operators.n The 1981 Amendments to the Clean Water Act require the builders
of sewage treatment plants to remain on the scene for a year after completion
of the construction work. " All these examples could be called legislated attempts
to combat the Prisoners' Dilemma by extending the game over time. Mutual
gains are recoverable because society can secure adequate reclamation or a
facility that works while the builder can avoid the liabilities readily extended
to absentees.
In another variation, the Supreme Court has sustained, against a variety
of constitutional objections, a gross disparity in Montana elk-hunting license
fees favoring local residents over out-of-staters.25 The differential is justified in
part by empirical or intuitive notions that non-residents are more likely to fit
the slob-hunter stereotype (a characterization of the exploiter is heard once
more), would consume the resource in excess, and would demand greater attention under the police powers. The extravagant license fee is a charge for
policing a game with strong risks of defection.
IV.

STRATEGIES AND

RISKS

IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAMES

Two questions immediately arise if it is accepted that breakaways from the
Prisoners' Dilemma are being pursued across the legal and political landscape.
First, how does one succeed in these games? Second, what is the consequence
of cooperative success by the players on the rules of law otherwise applicable?
In addressing these questions, it is important to remember that the game theory
"best" is provisional, fluid, and dependent on the other person's moves.
A.

Strategies

The tentative aspect of game theory strategy brings it close to the world of
21. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 5 509, 30 U.S.C. S 1259 (1982).
23. SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONc., 2D SEss., REPORT OF THE SuPERFUND SEON 301(E) STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAMAsS FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES -

24.

ANAL-

(Comm. Print 1982).
Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No.

YSIS AND IMPROVEMENT

OF LEcAL REMEDIES

97-117, S 12, 95 Stat. 1623, 1627 (codified at 33 U.S.C. S 1284(dX1)) (adding S 204(dXl) to the
Clean Water Act).
25. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
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legal practice where every case is a winner, and every case a loser. A brief
sample of the strategic variations will be presented.
1. Disguise
A number of years ago, a reporter for the Washington Post told me I was
the first person he had interviewed ever to address him as "Mr." We speculated
why news people, even at a first and formal meeting, should be treated with
an overweening familiarity; there are only "Bobs", "Toms", and "Sallys" in
the news business.
The secret is out: if you were a politician, or a public figure of any sort,
would you prefer to be presented to the public in a story by "Bob", or one
by "Mr. Smith"? The rush to make friends with newspaper reporters is an
attempt to string out the Prisoners' Dilemma, to extend the game over time.
The public official, and the reporter with an established beat, are playing a
repeated game. One wonders whether the gains available to the players through
cooperation yield an overall benefit in the currency of the dissemination of news
to the advantage of the public.
2.

Tit-for-Tat

The Axelrod book is filled with insights on appropriate strategies, developed
through the use of the computer contests representing the methodology of the
research. In particular, a tit-for-tat strategy proved unusually robust and successful. As Axelrod explains, 26 the strategy has certain features assuring success
in iterated games against all sorts of opposition. It doesn't emphasize the need
to defeat opponents in head-to-head competition; the point is to do well, capture
those nonzero-sum gains, and not necessarily vanquish the other fellow. Titfor-tat is not a first-defector strategy. Rather, it is a quick-forgiver strategy,
both useful in avoiding mutual recriminations and helpful in getting back on
the track of mutual gain without extended exercises in revenge-taking.
3.

Other Strategies

A host of other strategies are identifiable, and one can perceive them dimly
in the game-playing of environmental law. There is the strategy of two-tits-fora-tat, or a kind of benign indifference absent extreme provocation. The government often goes this charitable route in, say, enforcing the drinking water
standards.27
There is the strategy of two-tats-for-a-tit. This is a mild escalation policy
where each effrontery is paid back with interest. This is the strategy of litigators
26. R. AXELROD, supra note 13, ch. 9. For elaborations on the tit-for-tat strategy, see Allman,
Nice Guys Finish First, ScIENC 84, Oct. 1984, at 25; Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution
of Cooperation (Book Review), 93 YALE Lj. 1147 (1984). For a criticism of tit-for-tat as a military
strategy, see Wilson, Tit-for-Tat in Vienam Is What the Brass Hated, Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1986, at
DI, col. 5.
27. For an illustration, see 2 W. RotoF.ts, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR & WATER POLLUTION

S

4.20 (1986).
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in the adjudicatory hearing (pesticide cancellation proceedings serve as a nice
example), which leads inexorably to a slide in decorum. After four or five weeks
in a trial-type case, this strategy brings the principals close to the open brawl
or the fist-fight.
There is the tester strategy, which recommends defections occasionally to
detect whether the opposition has any spice. There is a tranquilizer strategy,
where cooperation is feigned or weakness advertised to set up a sucker punch
later in the day. The obvious legal doctrines under this heading would be laches
("they laid in wait until we were trapped") or estoppel ("they said the permit
was a 'sure thing' if . . ... ").

And let's not forget the NEPA cases where

objections are disclosed with enough detail to avoid preclusion but not too much
so that objections can be answered prior to reversal on appeal.
Many of us harbor fantasy strategies of massive retaliation - a threat to
cease all cooperative behavior - if the other person refuses to cooperate on
your terms. Clint Eastwood has some success with this sort of approach. But
obviously bringing the game to a sudden end is an improvident way to reap
gains from cooperation over time. Game theorists fully understand that exploitation is likely to rise sharply when the game is about to be concluded. In
debate, there is the parting shot; in politics, the lame duck and the last-minute
smear; in law, the reply brief.
B.

The Game Theory "Best" vs. The Social "Best"

The proposition that "cooperative" strategies have a tendency to evolve
under the most unlikely of circumstances is not to be greeted with universal
acclaim in the legal arena. Enforcement of environmental law often is perceived,
in theory and in practice, as involving negotiation, bargaining, and compromise. 28 In this world, cooperation may be understood as collusion, and twoparty "best" outcomes as a trading away of solemn statutory obligation.
In this context, one can imagine any number of statutory responses designed
to interdict "too much" cooperative exchange. The introduction of the citizen
suit (typically authorizing the enforcement of historical cleanup commitments)
is a popular legislative mechanism for bringing into the picture entities with
preferred outcomes likely to depart from the preferences of polluter (developer)
and the agency. 29 In most cases, the citizens group will be the short-termer,
interested in maximum payoffs in the case at hand, not game 2, 3, 4, and
beyond. This is a recipe for literal and unforgiving enforcement, letter-of-thelaw rectitude from a stem keeper of the public conscience. The fanatic always
has been a figure of respect and apprehension in game theory and decision
20
analysis.
The citizen as cooperation-buster is by no means the only possibility. Citizen
groups of different stripes may have distinctly contrasting short and long term

28.

See id. SS 3.33, 4.40.

29. See id. SS 3.4, 4.5; Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Mo. L. REv. 215 (1983).
30. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversights of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking,
4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 191, 212 & n.146 (1980).
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goals, prompting a variety of strategies when undertaking the compliance game.31
Similarly, different players may be drawn into the game with serious strategic
consequences. The recent revival of the Environmental Crimes Unit within the
Department of Justice 2 means, at a minimum, that agency negotiators have a
"bear-in-the-closet" alternative, call it massive retaliation, in the form of a
referral for criminal prosecution. This move can change the players and modify
the stakes, but there is reason to believe that another game begins. A perusal
of the dispositions of the cases of the Environmental Crimes Unit discloses
remedies beyond fines and jail sentences (restitution, the establishment of trust
funds, paybacks of various sorts) that bespeak bargaining of a serious kind.-"'
V.

CONCLUSION

Looking at legal questions through the lens of game theory reinforces a
number of healthy trends that are catching on (or enjoying a revival) in the
law schools. The first is the recognition that conflict, and legal responses to it,
must be viewed over time. 4 Dispute resolution, if it has a meaning in some
corners of the legal world, is increasingly irrelevant on the subjects of environmental and natural resources law; the better descriptive terms are management, containment, evolution, and change.
The tools and techniques of game theory underscore that it is not enough
to educate future lawyers in the details of the doctrine and the rich skills of
litigation. There is a world out there of bargaining and compromise, and some
of these skills can be taught. Knowledge, too, is needed of institutional systems
and their interactions. Information on these topics can be found across the
disciplines of the social and natural sciences. The law schools should continue
to mine these fields, searching for the ore and avoiding the spoils.
Game theory also reminds us again of that ever-present "gap" between the
law as it is ordained and that which is applied. This "gap" has many dimensions, of course, and it has brought upon the law schools the disgruntlement
of students, the disdain of practitioners, and the contempt of more than a few
members of academe. One mild but insistent lesson to draw is the pervasive
importance of empirical understandings of how the legal systems work in fact.
The games people play are forever tugging at the lawmakers' design.
There are differences between the law of the speed of light and the law of
the speed of autos. Exploring these differences may lead us yet to a science of
law.
31.

See 1 W. RODGEas, JR., supra note 27, S 3.4, at 213:
The national environmental organizations may put in a tub-thumping, short-term ap-

pearance in a long-standing regional environmental lawsuit advocating a quick-kill policy

that is an anathema to the citizen advocates who would have to live with it. Turned
around, the national groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Envi-

ronmental Defense Fund, or the Sierra Club may be in pursuit of a comprehensive bargain
that requires a strategy greatly different from the peripheral sniping that is the best course
for an outsider who has no hope of cracking the inner circles.
Id.
32. See 2 id. S 4.40 (for a brief description).
33.

See

ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES UNIT,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF INDICTMENTS AND

(compiled each fiscal year).
1 W. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 27, preface.

CONVICTIONS

34.
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